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A Practical Legal Education
1. Introduction
One of the central issues in regard to legal education during the past
half century has been whether law faculties ought to have a
theoretical or practical character. The debate has been an intense
one. It has taken on many forms and grown from many diverse
circumstances. Law societies periodically resurrect the issue.
Professional law faculties interminably debate it. Positions are
taken, factions are formed, and the unresolved outcome of the
debate has left curriculum and initial assumptions relatively
unchatged."
This essay questions one of the most important assumptions of
that debate - namely, that a practical legal education is a
non-evaluative, non-philosophical one. Sometimes a practical legal
education is conceived to be non-philosophical in that it is believed
to be bound up with the discovery of legal rules as opposed to some
normative evaluation of those rules. More recently, a practical legal
education has been conceived to be non-philosophical in that it has
been believed to be bound up with experience (most notably
presumed to be found in a law clinic). And experience has been
bound up with feelings or preferences rather than ideas.
The debate about legal education, unfortunately, has not taken
the form of a dialogue. The starting point for the protagonists in the
debate over legal education has been either the theoretical or
practical position. Sometimes the protagonists have sought to justify
why their respective starting points ought to be preferred to those of
their competitors. More often, they have implicitly assumed the
validity of their starting point and then gone on to elaborate the
curriculum and teaching methodology appropriate to satisfying that
*Professor, University of Windsor, Faculty of Law and Editor-in-Chief, Windsor
Yearbook of Access to Justice. An earlier draft of parts of this paper was presented
at the Annual Windsor-Wayne Lecture on February 23rd. 1981. It was also
presented to the members of the Friday Afternoon Club at the University of
Windsor during the Fall of 1980. I have benefited from their criticisms and, in
particular, those of Professor Leon Lysaght of the Detroit Law School.
I. See generally E. Veitch, "The Vocation of Our Era for Legal Education"
(1979), 44 Sask. L. Rev. 19, 31 ff; Susan Campbell, "Toward an Improved Legal
Education: Is there Anyone Out There?" (1979), 44 Sask. L. Rev. 81, esp. 89-96.
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starting-point. I shall take a different slant. I shall assume, for
argument's sake, that legal education ought to be a practical one.
My starting point puts to the sidelines such crucial, complex issues
as 'what historic role has a university played in Western
civilisation?', 'does a law faculty within the university community
possess collective social duties?', 'ought issues of social or political
justice to be a part of the future lawyer's education?', 'what
implications lie for the position of power exercised by lawyers?',
and the like. I assume that these issues have been resolved in favour
of a practical legal education. I only wish to consider what such a
practical legal education would entail.
What does the word "practical" mean? There appear to be at
least three connotations of the word. One suggests that "practical"
means "close to reality" or "in tune with the way the law really
is", empirically speaking. A second meaning suggests that
something is practical if it is the appropriate means to an end.
2
Usually, legal educators, practitioners and students have assumed
that legislative and judicial rules are the ends. A third account of the
word "practical" suggests the notion of judgment or "intuitive
reason" as opposed to the rational derivation or independent
justification of conclusions. 3 No doubt, the advocates of a practical
legal education use the term "practical" in one or a mixture of these
three senses. Each sense opposes the concept of a normative
2. One assumes the end and considers by what means it is to be attained, and if it
seems to be produced by several means he considers by which it is best and most
easily produced, while if it is achieved by one only he considers how it will be
achieved by this, and by what means that will be achieved till he comes to the first
cause, which in the order of discovery is last. For the person who deliberates seems
to investigate and analyse in the way described as though he were analysing a
geometrical construction (not all seeking is deliberation but all deliberation is
seeking), and what is last in the order of analysis seems to be first in the order of
being brought about. And if one comes on an impossibility, he gives up the search,
e.g. if he needs money and this cannot be got; but if a thing appears possible then
he tries to do it.
From Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1112 as quoted in D. Wiggins, "Deliberation
and Practical Reason" in Joseph Raz, ed., Practical Reasoning (Oxford: Oxford
U. Press, 1978) at note 3.
3. That practical wisdom is not deductive theoretical knowledge is plain. For
practical wisdom is, as I have said, of the ultimate and particular- as is the whole
subject matter of action. In this respect practical wisdom is the counterpart or dual
of theoretical intuition. Theoretical intellect or intuition is of the ultimate in the
sense that it is of ultimate universal concepts and axioms which are too primitive or
fundamental to admit of further analysis or of justification from without. [At the
opposite extreme] practical wisdom [as a counterpart of theoretical reason] also
treats of matters which defy justification from without. Practical wisdom is of what
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philosophic education, because to question how the law ought to be,
to question the ends of the legal system and to justify legal
conclusions by an appeal to independently-derived criteria is a very
theoretical enterprise indeed. Such an enterprise would place the
student in the 'ought world of ideas, moral dilemmas, and
moral-political argument.
I wish to question whether the above assumed dichotomy
between a practical legal education and the 'ought' world of ideas,
moral dilemmas and moral-political argument exists. I shall do so
initially by examining the claim that a practical legal education
would be about the discovery of legal rules. I shall suggest that it is
not. My argument will make two unorthodox claims - first, that
there are no clearly understood, pre-established legal rules, and
second, that there must be an intellectual basis for experiential
forms of legal education substantiating these claims. I shall then
elaborate a model of legal education which I shall call the reflective
model. 4 I shall show why the reflective model is a practical model
in that it is in "tune with the way the law really is" and in that it is
the "most appropriate means" for judicial officers to come to grips
with issues of formal justice, substantive justice and other crucial
concepts in a democratic state. I shall then flesh out the content of
the reflective model of a practical legal education. By so doing, I
hope to meet the challenge raised by Professor Rod MacDonald in
his important essay "Legal Education on the.Threshold of the
1980's: Whatever Happened to the Great Ideas of the 60's". 5
II. Discovering the Legal Rule
What I wish to suggest is that the very process of finding the "ratio
is ultimate and particular in the different but analogously basic sense of needing to.
be simply perceived. By perception here I do not mean sense perception but the
kind of perception or insight one needs to see that a triangle, say, is one of the basic
or ultimate components [of a figure which is to be constructed with ruler and
compass]. [For there is no routine procedure for analysing a problem figure into the
components by which one may construct it with rule and compasses]. The analysis
calls for insight and there is a limit to what one can say about it. But even this sort
of insight is more akin to sense perception than practical wisdom is really akin to
From Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics as quoted in D. Wiggins, "'Deliberation and
Practical Reasoning" in Joseph Raz, ed., Practical Reasoning (Oxford: Oxford U.
Press, 1978) at 148.
4. See Section V infra.
5. (1979), 44Sask. L. Rev. 39.
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decidendi" of a judicial decision does not allow for the existence of
pre-established, clear legal rules. This claim is a very difficult one
to support. It would be much easier to focus upon the many
manipulative techniques available to the competent lawyer in his
construction of a statutory provision. It would also be easier to
emphasize the many circuitious routes available to a competent
lawyer in avoiding an old precedent or creating a new one. But the
"ratio decidendi" is the heart of the common law system. And if I
can show that even the "ratio decidendi" does not allow for the
existence of pre-established, well-understood legal rules in some
cases then I shall have partially eroded the claim that the real world
of law is about legal rules and that a practical legal education should
be bound up with the discovery of legal rules. For how could the
real world be about legal rules if the rules are neither pre-established
nor well-understood and if many conflicting, equally authoritative
rules may be chosen from any judicial decision.
The heart of the common law system is the binding quality of the
rule in an earlier judicial decision. Although other, non-
philosophical reasons may have caused its development, its
justification lies in the principle of formal justice. Formal justice
requires that like cases be treated alike.6 All persons who possess
the same likeness must be brought under the same rule. The
problem is to ascertain the likeness criterion. And for this, the
common law has provided us with the notion of the "ratio
decidendi" of a case. This is what is supposed to bind later courts.
And it is the "ratio" or the "reason for the decision" which
possesses the force of law.
The question is, however, how does a lawyer find the "ratio" of
a previous judicial decision?
Unfortunately, the common law courts have not devised one
sure-fire method of finding the "ratio". Several methods have been
proposed and used. Sometimes a judge or lawyer follows one
method; sometimes another. The choice of the method directly
6. See generally, Brian Barry, Political Argument (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul. 1965) at 100-102.
7. See generally, J. L. Montrose, Precedent in English Law and Other Essays
(Shannon: Irish University Press, 1968) at 151-152; R.W.M. Dias, Jurisprudence
(London: Butterworths, 1970, 3rd Edn.) at 63-72; A. L. Goodhart, "'The Ratio
Decidendi of a Case" (1934), 50 L.Q.R. 40; A. Rupert N. Cross, Precedent in
English Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977, 3rd edn.), c.2; G. W. Paton, A
Textbook of Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972) at 209-210; Julius
Stone, "The Ratio of the Ratio Decidendi" (1959), 22 M.L.R. 597.
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delimits the scope and content of the rule. Indeed, the choice of the
method can determine whether a rule of law even exists, for one
method may direct the lawyer to one rule, whereas a second method
may direct him to a conflicting rule. Consequently, I shall argue that
the very heart of the common law leads the competent lawyer to
unclear, uncertain, ambiguous and, sometimes, conflicting rules of
law.
Common law courts find a "ratio" by at least three different
methods. 8 The first, known as the classical method, states that the
"ratio" is the principle of law which the court declared in its
original judgment to justify and explain its outcome. 9 This requires
that the lawyer return to the original precedent in order to ascertain
what the judges considered necessary to their own decisions.
Under the second method, which could be labelled the
"Goodhart approach", 10 the lawyer tries to connect the fact
category in the original precedent to the legal consequences as
reflected in the eventual decision. If a future case falls within this
fact category, then the lawyer and judge are bound to advise that the
same legal consequence will ensue. Accordingly, the "ratio" of a
case is found by taking account
a) of the facts treated by the judge as material, and
b) his decision as based upon them.
If the original judgment considered certain facts as immaterial then
they must be excluded from the fact category. But if there existed
facts which the judgment impliedly considered material then,
according to the Ooothat mehod, they most be part of the fact
category of the rule.
The third method of ascertaining the "ratio" of a judicial
decision might be called the "retrospective" process." Under this
test, the "ratio decidendi" is the rule of law for which later judges
(and, possibly, scholars) consider the case to be of binding
authority. Accordingly, it is not to the original judgment that one
looks. Nor to the express nor implied material facts. Rather, we go
to the later (often many) judicial decisions which have made a
8. See id. Actually, the literature indicates modifications and additions to the three
methods. This fact only strengthens the following argument.
9. This method is adopted by G. W. Paton, supra, note 7 at 209-2 10.
10. This method is elaborated by A. L. Goodhart in supra, note 7. See also Rupert
Cross, Precedent in English Law, supra, note 7 at 66-76.
11. The term is my own. It best describes the method adopted, for example, by
Montrose in Precedent in English Law, supra, note 7.
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statement about the rule of law in the original precedent.
In order to demonstrate that the heart of the common law system
does not necessarily bring pre-established, well-understood rules of
law for future lawyers and judges, I shall briefly recount how the
Canadian Supreme Court proceeded to find the "ratio" in three
series of cases. In the first two series the Court consciously
concerned itself with the doctrine of "stare decisis". In the third,
we shall take a deeper look at the implications which the operation
of the "ratio decidendi" has for the real world of law.
I. The "Rule" in Binus
Chief Justice Cartwright set out two issues which faced the Supreme
Court in Binus v. The Queen. 12 The first issue was whether it was
necessary for the tribunal of fact to be satisfied that the accused's
conduct went beyond inadvertent negligence and amounted to
advertent negligence in a charge of dangerous driving under the
Criminal Code. Cartwright, C.J., who delivered the majority
judgment in Binus, held that proof of inadvertent negligence was
insufficient because of the "ratio decidendi" of the Supreme Court
in Mann v. The Queen.' 3 Interestingly, he discovered the Mann
"ratio" by the retrospective method. That is, Cartwright C.J. did
not go to the original legal proposition enunciated by the Mann
Court itself. Rather, he restated the Mann "ratio" "which was [in
hindsight] a necessary step to the judgment pronounced." In
contrast, Judson J. discovered a very different rule in Mann by
emplolying the classical method. He contcluded that the actual
judgment in Mann dealt with a very different issue from Binus and
that Cartwright C.J. had simply collected "obiter" observations in
Mann to create a legal rule.
12. [1967] S.C.R. 594,1196811 C.C.C. 227, 2 C.R.N.S. 118.
13. [1966] S.C.R. 238, [19661 2.C.C.C. 273, 47 C.R. 400, 56 D.L.R. (2d).
Cartwright C. J. expressed his opinion about the Mann rule in this way in Binus v.
The Queen [1967] S.C.R. 594 at 600-601:
but it appears to me that in Mann v. The Queen at least five of the seven
members of this Court who heard the appeal decided that proof of inadvertent
negligence is not sufficient to support a conviction under s.221(4) and that in so
deciding they were expressing a legal proposition which was a necessary step to
the judgment pronounced. I find it impossible to treat what was said as 'obiter'
and, in my respectful view, that proposition should have been accepted by the
Court of Appeal under the principle of 'stare decisis'. The binding effect of a
proposition of law enunciated as a necessary step to the judgment pronounced is
not lessened by the circumstance that the Court might have reached the same
result for other reasons.
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In the later Supreme Court decision of Peda v. The Queen 4 the
judges again reached different statements about the rule in Binus by
employing different methods for discovering that rule. Judson J.,
who delivered the majority judgment, used the classical method of
finding the Binus rule.r By going to the original majority judgment
in Binus Judson was able to conclude that the so-called
"advertent-inadvertent proposition" of Cartwright C.J.'s "was not
a necessary step to the judgment pronounced, and [was] not
binding".16 Pigeon J., in a separate majority judgment, also
employed the classical method for discovering the Binus rule. 17 By
so doing, he could conclude that he was not bound by the Binus rule
because it was too narrow to apply to the circumstances in Peda.
Interestingly, Cartwright C.J. replied to Judson and Pigeon J.J.
that he was "prepared to assume that on an application of the
principle of 'stare decisis', Binus is not a binding authority
... -18 But as in his earlier Mann decision, Cartwright C.J. used
the retrospective method to discover his Binus rule. By going to
"the combined effect of the judgments of this Court in O'Grady v.
Sparling'9 and Mann v. The Queen20'", Cartwright C.J. restated the
legal rule which he believed himself compelled to follow. 21 He
could "find no ground sufficient to warrant . . . refusing to follow
the carefully considered judgments of this Court in O'Grady and in
Mann on the point now under consideration .... ,,22 Nor, for that
14. [1969] S.C.R. 905, [1969]4 C.C.C. 245,7 C.R.N.S. 243, 6 D.L.R. (3d) 177.
15. Id., at 916-917.
16. Id., at 917.
17. Id., at 920:
because 'a case is only an authority for what it actually decides', one should not
read what was thus written as if it was an enactment [as the retrospective method
encourages] but ascertain what was actually decided. It seems clear that the
actual decision was ....
18. Id., at 910.
19. [1960] S.C.R. 804, 128 C.C.C. 1, 33 C.R. 293, 25 D.L.R. (2d) 145.
20. [1966] S.C.R. 238,[1966]2 C.C.C. 273, 47 C.R. 400, 56 D.L.R. (2d) 1.
21. After re-stating the O'Grady and Mann decisions in his own words, Cartwright
C.J. proceeded to affirm that, notwithstanding the fact that a provincial statute was
at issue in O'Grady and Mann in contrast to Binus and Peda,
the conclusion appears to me to be inescapable that the decision that Parliament
has not defined "'inadvertent negligence" as a crime was the enunciation of a
legal proposition which was a necessary step to the judgment pronounced in
each case. It follows that unless we are prepared to depart from the 'ratio
decidendi' of both these cases we cannot say .
Peda v. The Queen, [ 1969] S.C.R. 905 at 910.
22. Id., at911.
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matter, would Judson J., had he not chosen the classical method of
discovering a common law rule.
2. The Rule in Harrison v. Carswell
The second case in which the Supreme Court of Canada has dealt at
length with the doctrine of precedent is Harrison v. Carswell.
2 3
Peter Harrison, manager of Polo Park Shopping Centre, had swore
informations against Sophie Carswell for unlawfully trespassing
upon the premises of Fairview Corporation Ltd. (the owner of Polo
Park Centre) contrary to the Petty Trespasses Act, R.S.M. 1970.
Mr. Justice Dickson, whose judgment was concurred in by four
others, believed himself bound by the rule in the 1971 Supreme
Court of Canada decision of Peters v. The Queen. 24 Dickson J.
discovered the Peters rule by following the classical method of
going directly to the legal proposition considered necessary for the
decision in the original Peters judgment. Because the Supreme
Court had responded to the legal issues in Peters in the negative
without reasons, Dickson J., having chosen the classical method,
fell back upon Gale C.J.'s legal proposition in the original Court of
Appeal decision of Peters. 
2 5
In contrast, Laskin C.J.C. reached a very different conclusion
about the "ratio" in Peters by choosing Goodhart's method of
finding the "ratio". According to Laskin C.J.C., any judicial
statements, such as Gale's, must be read in the light of the material
facts and issues before the judge. The Goodhart method of
discovering the Peters rule influenced Laskin C.J.C.'s conclusion.2 6
Both the material facts and the issues in Carswell differed from
those in Peters, and therefore Laskin, C.J.C. had little difficulty in
holding that "the Peters case is neither in law, nor in fact a
controlling authority for the present case."
23. [197612 S.C.R. 200(1976), 62 D.L.R. (3d) 68.
24. (1971), 17 D.L.R. (3d) 128.
25. Namely.
"With respect to the first ground of appeal, it is our opinion that an owner who
has granted a right of entry to a particular class of the public has not thereby
relinquished his or its right to withdraw its invitation to the general public or any
particular member thereof, and that if a member of the public whose invitation
to enter has been withdrawn refuses to leave, he thereby becomes a trespasser
and may be prosecuted under the Petty Trespasses Act.."
26."The oral reasons of Gale, C.J.O., for the Ontario Court of Appeal, were
undoubtedly geared to the specific facts before him, and it is therefore unfair, in
my view, to read, without that context, his general statement [quoted above]."
Harrison v. Carswell, [ 1976] 2 S.C.R. 200 at 204.
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3. The "Rule" in Drybones
We have examined the two most authoritative statements in Canada
concerning the doctrine of "stare decisis". Notwithstanding the fact
that each judge 27 acknowledged the importance of the binding
quality of the "ratio decidendi", each chose to find the "ratio" in a
different manner from his colleagues with significant implications
for the scope, meaning and, indeed, the very existence of respective
legal rules. I shall now look at a classic case with which all
Canadian lawyers are familiar, R v. Drybones.2 8 As above, I shall
show how the choice of the particular method of finding the
Drybones "ratio" is directly connected to the very existence,
meaning and scope of any rule of law for which Drybones could be
said to be of binding authority. Second, this treatment will provide a
hint about the issues with which the real world of law is concerned.
The Drybones court faced two issues. First, did section 94(b)
29 of
the Indian Act contradict section l(b)30 of the Canadian Bill of
Rights? Second, if there was a conflict, what was its legal effect?
The second issue did not have to be faced unless the first issue had
been resolved affirmatively. Interestingly, all of the Justices
explicitly or implicitly held that the two statutory provisions
contradicted each other in the Drybones case."' Given that
27. It is significant that before he went into his wider discussion of the history and
social conditions surrounding the social interests at issue in the case, Chief Justice
Laskin worked within the traditional framework of legal analysis by presuming
himself bound by the "ratio" of earlier decisions.
28. R v. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282, 9 D.L.R. (3d) 473, 71 W.W.R. 161, 10
C.R.N.S. 334, [1970]3 C.C.C. 355.
29. 94. An Indian who
(a) has intoxicants in his possession,
(b) is intoxicated, or
(c) makes or manufactures intoxicants off a reserve, is guilty of an offence and
is liable on summary conviction to a fine or not less than ten dollars and not
more than fifty dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months
or to both fine and imprisonment.
30. 1. It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have existed and
shall continue to exist without discrimination by reason of race, national origin,
colour, religion or sex, the following human rights and fundamental freedoms,
namely,
(a) the right of the individual to equality before the law and the protection of the
la'.
31. Ritchie J., speaking for himself and four others (the majority), examined the
first and second issues in turn. He held that there was a conflict with equality before
the law and, secondly, that the legal effect of that conflict was to render s.94(b) of
the Indian Act inoperative. Hall J., who affirmed the majority opinion, focused
upon the first issue. Cartwright C.J., dissenting, asserted that "[iln approaching
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outcome, it is all the more intriguing to discover the rule of law for
which Drybones authoritatively stands with respect to the first issue.
The Drybones decision involved one judicial decision and the
meaning of one statutory enactment. We begin with the commonly
accepted working hypothesis that there exists a rule of law for which
we can say that a case is binding. But if we look for the rule in
Drybones we shall find that there is none. Nor could there be. Even
when one works within the conventional hypothesis, we have to be
doubtful that there is one rule identified with any one judicial
decision because there are several, equally legitimate methods for
finding a "ratio decidendi", and because the various methods will
likely lead to different rules, varying in their meaning, scope and
sometimes their very existence.
If we choose the classical method and go to the rule of law which
the original Drybones Court considered necessary for its decision,
we would be bound by two rules. The one would arguably look to
unequal sentences ("more harshly") and the other would relate to
dissimilar criminal offences between races:
1. equality before the law is violated if one individual or group
of individuals is treated more harshly than another under the
law;3
2
2. equality before the law is violated if an offence (for example,
of being intoxicated in a private place) exists for one
individual on account of his race but does not exist for
another individual in similar CIrcumstances.
s3
On the other hand, if we applied the Goodhart method to the
Ritchie judgment alone, the conclusion would be warranted that the
rule of law would be obscure and uncerfain in its scope because of
the uncertainty as to what the three judges deemed to be material
this question I will assume the correctness of the view that s.94(b) infringes the
right of the respondent to equality before the law declared by s. l(b) of the Bill
....- Supra, note 28 at 285. He proceeded to face the second issue. Abbott and
Pigeon J.J., dissenting, also posited the second issue as the critical one, implicitly
accepting that s.94(b) offended s. l(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights.
32. R. v.Drybones, [19701S.C.R. 282 at297. Emphasis added.
33. R. v. Drybones, id. at 297. Emphasis added. Ritchie J. used similar terms in
concluding his judgment at 298: "[ilt appears to me to be desirable to make it plain
that these reasons for judgment are limited to a situation in which, under the laws of
Canada. it is made an offence punishable at law on account of race, for a person to
do something which all Canadians who are not members of that race may do with
impunity .. " Emphasis added.
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facts. The conclusion would also be warranted that one could
authoritatively derive several conflicting rules from the one decision
by using the Goodhart method. There were at least six possible
material facts in Drybones:
(a) There exists a difference in minimum - maximum sentences
for Indians and non-Indians found intoxicated in a public
place;
3 4
(b) Criminal rather than civil law is involved;
(c) The Indian Act affects Indians off a Reserve and thereby
triggers a possible conflict with the laws for non-Indians.
3 5
(d) Whereas there exists an offence for an Indian to be
intoxicated in a private place off a Reserve, no such offence
exists for a non-Indian.
3 6
(e) Drybones was found intoxicated in the "Old Stope Hotel".
This is presumed to be a public place.
(f) The different treatment was on account of race.
37
Because Mr. Justice Ritchie expressly included fact (d) 3 8 and
impliedly included fact (f)3 9 in his fact category, Drybones could be
said to stand for rule two which we derived above by using the
classical method. But this rule could be either expanded or
narrowed by adding or subtracting facts (a), 40 (b)41 and (f)42 to the
34. The penalty for an Indian convicted of being intoxicated in a public place was a
minimum fine of S 10 and a maximum imprisonment of 3 months. The penalty for a
non-Indian being convicted for the same offence was a minimum fine of S10 and a
maximum imprisonment of 30 days pursuant to s. 19(l) of the Liquor Ordinance
wc was 3 f ese-leal a 1catiob ia th- N<tlwt Thw todek (R..O.N.W.T. 1957,
c.60). Consequently, the Indian was subject to a harsher penalty than a non-Indian
for committing the same offence.
35. That is. there would be no possible conflict if there were one set of laws for
Indians on a Reserve with a different set of laws for non-Indians. Only when the
Indian ventured off his Reserve would the potential for conflict arise.
36. The Liquor Ordinance reads that "No person shall be in an intoxicated
condition in a public place .. " [R.O.N.W.T. 1957, c.60, s. 19(1).]
37. By inference, it would be legitimate for there to be an offence for an Indian
from one particular tribe but not from another.
38. In Ritchie J.'s words. "'[tlhe important question raised by this appeal has its
origin in the fact that in the Northwest Territories it is not an offence for anyone
except an Indian to be intoxicated otherwise than in a public place." See R. v.
Dnbones, [1970] S.C.R. 282 at 289. Both of Ritchie J.'s statements of his ratio
su~ pra, xwkts 32 avmd 33 kt)dk
39. See his second statement of his "'ratio" in text, supra, note 33 and
accompanying text.
40. If "more harshly" means a difference in sentence.
One should note that immediately after isolating fact "d", as "the important
question", Ritchie J. went on to emphasize fact "a", (that is, the difference in
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fact category. The latter possibility would create three further rules:
3. equality before the law means equality in the sentences
("penalties" or "sanctions") imposed against two or more
individuals who commit the same offence;
4. equality before the law means equal treatment in the criminal
law only;
5. discrimination by reason of race, national origin, colour,
religion or sex in whatever manner it manifests itself is
grounds to violate equality before the law.
Ritchie J. did not identify fact (e) (being intoxicated in a public
place) as material. Had he done so, the second rule could be rejected
since the same offence (intoxication in a public place) existed for
both Indians and non-Indians.
43
According to the retrospective approach towards finding a
"ratio", the issue is 'what rule of law is Drybones, in hindsight, of
binding authority?'. This requires that we go to all later higher court
decisions which have defined the DTybones "ratio". If we confine
ourselves to only one such decision, Attorney-General for Canada
v. Lavell, 44 we find that each of the three judgments in Lavell vary
in their statements of the Drybones' "ratio" with respect to the
meaning of Section l(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights. Each
judgment clings onto different facts as material in Diybones.
Diybones could not be said to stand for rule five set out above
(according to Ritchie J. in Lavel 4 5) nor rule one, 46 two, 47 three 48 or
sentences). His first statement of his "ratio" (supra, note 32) might also be read as
adding fact "a" to his fact category in that he makes reference to Indians being
treated -more harshly" than others under the law. Of course, Indians are also
treated 'more harshly" where an offence exists for an Indian but none exists for a
non-Indian. Accordingly, it is difficult to know whether Ritchie J. considered fact
"a" as material in his original Drybones judgment.
41. Although he referred to the difference in offences, he did not consciously
address the possible dichotomy.
42. See supra, note 37.
43. The Goodhart approach only looks to the facts which the judges in the original
precedent considered material. The retrospective approach would allow later judges
and scholars to isolate any fact as relevant and thereby alter the legal rule.
44. A-G. Canada v. Lavell; Isaac v. Bedard, [1974] S.C.R. 1349; (1973), 38
D.L.R. (3d) 481;23 C.R.N.S. 197; 11 R.F.L. 333 (S.C.C.).
45. Mrs. Lavell had married a non-Indian. Pursuant to s. 12(1) (b) of the Indian Act
her name was struck from the Indian Register because her marriage to a non-Indian
disentitled her to Indian status. Mrs. Lavell claimed discrimination on the grounds
of sex because an Indian male would not lose his Indian status if he married a
non-Indian female. A-G. Canada v. Lavell, id., at 1363.
After approvingly quoting Laskin C.J.'s assessment in Curr v. The Queen
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four49 (according to Laskin J. in Lavell). More affirmatively,
Drybones would stand for rule four (according to Ritchie J.)5o or
rule five (according to Laskin 5' and Abbott J.J.5 2). Hall J. had
Ui912) S.C.R. K69 as "to what constituted the Drybones' "trio" 1but not
necessarily consistently), Ritchie J. asserted that (again relying upon his
interpretation of Laskin J.'s Curr statement) the Canadian Bill of Rights "cannot
be invoked unless one of the enumerated rights and freedoms has been denied
..... Discrimination by reasons of race or sex alone (that is, fact "f" above) could
not be a ground to strike down federal legislation. "When, as in the case of Regina
v. Drybones, denial of one of the enumerated rights is occasioned by reason of
discrimination, then, as Laskin J. has said, the discrimination affords an 'additional
lever' " in the sense of an added weight. Id., at 1364.
46. See infra, note 50.
47. A-G for Canada v. Lavell, id., at 1383. In Laskin J.'s words, "It would be
unsupportable in principle to view the Drybones case as turning on the fact that the
challenged s.94 of the Indian Act created an offence visited by punishment. The
gist of the judgment lay in the legal disability imposed upon a person by reason of
his race when other persons were under no similar restraint." tEmrphasis added).
48. In his first statement of the Drybones "ratio" Laskin J. expressly excluded
fact "a" (the difference in sentences) from his Drybones rule.
49. In his first statement, again, Laskin J. expressly excluded fact "b" (the criminal
vs. civil law dichotomy from his Drybones rule).
50. Ritchie J. made five statements in Lavell about his Drybones decision. In his
second statement Ritchie J. distinguished Drybones on the grounds that Drybones
involved criminal rather than civil law and, secondly, that the offence at issue in
Drybones affected Indians offa Reserve. As he stated at 1370,
The section of the Indian Act at issue in Drybones was "the only provision
therein made which creates an offence for any behaviour of an Indian off a
reserve, and it will be plain that there is a wide difference between legislation
such as s. 12 (1) (b) governing the civil rights of designated persons living on
Indian reserves to the use and benefit of Crown lands, and criminal legislation
such as s.94 which creates an offence punishable at law for Indians to act in a
certain fashion when off a reserve. The former legislation is enacted as a part of
the plan devised by Parliament, under s. 91(24) for the regulation of the internal
domestic life of Indians on Reserves. The latter is criminal legislation
exclusively concerned with behaviour of Indians off a reserve.
Ritchie J. then followed this by emphasizing the difference in minimum -
maximum sentences as material.
51. The crucial fact for Laskin J. was the existence of "a legal disability" by
reason of race. The common fact category in Drybones and Lavell, according to
Laskin in his first re-statement of the Drybones rule, was the "statutory
excommunication" or "the invidious distinction of race or sex".
In his second re-statement of the Drybones rule Laskin J. again isolated the racial
discrimination in opposition to the enumerated rights as the crucial factor in
Drybones. Seeing his own statement in Curr very differently from Xitchie I.,
Laskin J. stressed that he had "made it clear" in Curr that legislation could be
rendered inoperative "if it manifests any of the prohibited forms of discrimina-
tion". Id., at 1387. That is, Drybones had made the "without discrimination"
clause (see supra, note 30) an independent source for rendering federal legislation
inoperative.
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supported the latter rule in his separate majority judgment in
Drybones.53 What complicates the matter even further is that the
statements by Ritchie and Laskin J.J. in Lavell would be of equal
weight on this issue because their respective reasons were equally
supported by other members of the Court (Pigeon J. resolving the
case on a different issue). In addition, Mr. Justice Ritchie made five
statements in Lavell about his Drybones decision. From these
statements one can derive two further rules as to the Drybones'
ratio:
6. equality before the law only arises as an issue when Indians
journey off a Reserve thereby triggering a possible conflict
with the laws of non-Indians;
7. equality before the law means the equal application and
enforcement of a law to whomever the particular law relates.
Interestingly, the common rejection of the seventh rule under the
classical analysis was adopted as the "'ratio" under the retrospective
method. 54 Of course, in order to use the retrospective method
properly, we would be required to examine the many later (and
future) judicial decisions which have claimed to lay down the rule in
Drybones.
II. The Preference Model of Legal Education: herein of Cynical
Realism55
There are at least two problems which immediately arise in regard to
In his final paragraph of the Lavell judgment, Laskin J. rejected "the spurious
contention" of the "off the Reserve" proposition.
52. Abbott J., also in dissent, affirmed Laskin J's reasons. He also rejected Ritchie
J's resurrection of the Gonzales rule (see supra, rule 7 in text).
53. Hall J. considered the fifth rule as necessary for his decision:
"discrimination in every law of Canada by reason of race, • . . in respect of the
human rights and fundamental freedoms set out in s. 1. in whatever way that
discrimination may manifest itself not only as between Indian and non-Indian
but as between all Canadians - whether Indian or non-Indian" is
"repudicated".
R. v. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282 at 300. (Emphasis added).
54. In Ritchie J's words,
equality before the law under the Bill of Rights means equality of treatment in
the enforcement and application of the laws of Canada before the law
enforcement authorities and the ordinary Courts of the land .
A.-G.for Canada v. Lavell, id., at 1373.
55. The word "preference" I take from John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, Mary
Warnock, ed., (London: Fontana, 1962) at 131:
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the above argument. The first is that it seems to follow that the
lawyer's lawyer may legitimately "pick and choose" whatever rule
of law he feels he ought to follow. He may "play the game" of
analyzing rules but that process, it would seem, merely camouflages
his own feelings about the parties, justice, power or whatever. Or,
alternatively, he may outwardly disclaim loyalty to the binding
quality of legislative or judicial rules and openly state his preference
as to what the social policy of the rule ought to be. In either case,
the implication would seem to be that the rule of law in Binus,
Peters or Dr'bones is whatever the lawyer, judge, law teacher, law
student or politician wants it to be. It is feelings which are crucial.
Justice would seem to exist whenever our feelings coincide with
what the legislature or the court declares the law to be at a particular
point in time. This critical appeal to feelings underlies what I shall
call the "preference model" of legal education - a model for the
cynical realist.
Let us return to my initial description of the meaning of
"practical". I suggested that there were three connotations to the
phrase "practical legal education": first, that "practical" means
"close to reality" or "in tune with the way the law really is rather
than the way it ought to be"; second, that a practical legal education
means that the goals and values of the law are given and that legal
education ought to focus upon the most appropriate means of
achieving those goals and values; third, that it means "intuitive
reason" or judgment rather than the rational derivation or
independent justification of conclusions. Contrary to our initial
hypothesis that a practical legal education would be bound up with
the assertion and elaboration of rules of law, the above discussion
would seem to suggest that a practical legal education would be
oriented towards the preferences underlying the analysis of the
rules. It is the preferences which are the reality of law. They are the
givens. They are the basis of our judgments - not any rational
derivation or appeal to independent principles. Accordingly, a
practical legal education would create the environment where the
... but aa q qiown oa a paint of coandtict, tot supported by reasons, can ott
count as one person's preference; and if the reasons when given, are a mere
appeal to a similar preference felt by other people, it is still only many people's
liking instead of one. (Emphasis added).
I use the term "model" in the same sense as Noel Lyon in "Modelling as an
Approach to Judicial Reform" (1981), 1. Windsor Yearb. Access to Justice 281.
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student would become conscious of his feelings as well as the
feelings, presumably, of his fellow citizen. Having become more
aware of his inward feelings, the law teacher and student would go
on to translate those feelings to concrete problems. A mixture of
psychology, group therapy and experience outside the university
would appear to be indispensable guides to a practical legal
education. No doubt some advocates of clinical legal education
have considered the law clinic as the suitable environment to carry
out the preference model of legal education. To the extent that one
would study judicial decisions, one would examine them as
reflectors of social history or psychological generalisations. And
legislative rules would be examined for the purpose of identifying
the politically stronger pressure groups in contemporary society.
I now wish to suggest that although the preference model of legal
education might prima facie be the implication of section one of
this paper, the preference model inadequately serves a constitutional
democracy. Before I argue such, however, a distinction between the
discovery of a legislative or judicial rule and its justification 56 will
be made.
1. Discovery vs. Justification
The initial discovery of a rule in any concrete case may very well be
the outcome of internal impulses, hunches, beliefs or inarticulate
assumptions on the part of the decision-maker. A study of the
discovery process would consider the psychological, physiological,
social, economic, political, and othey intenalised ptessutes which
motivate a judge or lawyer. Although Hume may have been correct
that these pressures constitute the "natural" as opposed to the
"artificial" world of reason,57 Hume's claim does not preclude the
possibility that reasons for rules, once articulated, become
internalised into one's belief system just as any other factors
external to the person's psyche may become internalised under
certain circumstances over time. Nor does Hume's claim foreclose
an inquiry into whether any given rule, once discovered, is
justifiable. The latter inquiry raises an entirely different set of
questions from the discovery of a rule. The justificatory process
appeals to a standard or set of standards external to and independent
56. This distinction is raised by Richard Wasserstrom in The Judicial Decision
(Stanford: Stanford U. Press, 1961) at 25ff.
57. See generally, David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1978, 2 ed.), Bk III, Part II, Sect. 1-6.
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of the person's psyche or belief system.
This distinction is an important one. With respect to the discovery
process we are content with mere assertions of rules, policy or
principle. But as regards the justificatory process one is required to
pry behind the assertions. Mere assertions are not enough.
The point to note here is that the commitment to reasoned
justification is not part and parcel of a properly decided judicial
decision within the preference model of legal education. Nor is it
expected of the student. Quite the contrary. 58 There is no obligation
on the part of judge, lawyer or student to appeal to reasons because
the preference model of legal education does not allow for the
existence of an independent criterion of justice separate from and
prior to the innate feelings of the parties (including judge and
lawyer) to the case. Rather, the preference model of legal education
considers a legislative or judicial decision just if the decision
accurately reflects the strongest feelings on the issue before the
legislature or court. Usually, we assume that the latter condition is
satisfied when the majority of the legislature makes the decision.
How, then, does a student evaluate a legislative or judicial
decision in the preference model of legal education? The process of
evaluation, it would seem, involves a very different dialogue with a
very different criterion of knowledge than that of a commitment to
principled reasoning as an end in itself. When the student must
evaluate the soundness or correctness of a legislative or judicial
decision on the preference model, he need not be concerned with the
internal consistency, truthfulness, the moral content, or the
consistency of the reasons with independently derived principles of
justice. Rather, the student must question whether the immediate
decision accurately reflects the more intense or, possibly, the more
numerous preferences towards the issue in dispute. The student
within the preference model of legal education need only concern
58. How, then, do we ascertain a sound legal opinion or judicial decision under the
preference model of legal education? The intensity and numerical weight of the
preferences are what count. Ultimately, a disputant wins out if she is more
powerful than her competitors. But power does not logically necessitate a
commitment to reasoned argument. Reasons may be foresaken for other means to
power at any fime in any circumstance. As one shifts from the pole of influence to
the pole of domination, force, violence, brutality and terror serve as threshold
techniques. Although reasoned justification may be a means to power in some
circumstances, the preference model of legal education assumes a very different
dialogue with a very different criterion of knowledge from any commitment to
reasoned justification.
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himself with discovery of legal rules rather than their justification.
Indeed, to suggest that one could characterize the student's
endeavour in the preference model in terms of his analysis of the
character of the argument supporting any judicial or legislative
decision wrongly assumes that argument would ever be required.
Judges and legislators need only decide under the preference model
of legal education. Mere assertions are adequate.
2. The Preference Model and Its Implications.59
Why are mere preferences not a strong enough foundation upon
which to design a legal education? Why ought we not to be content
with the mere discovery of legal rules? Why is the competent lawyer
obliged to justify the rules? And why must the justification be in
terms of some independent standard rather than in terms of his own
o someone else' s pyefeyences?
(a) Formal Justice
In the first place, if judges and lawyers were content to discover
legal rules without any attempt to justify them or, alternatively, if
judges and lawyers did attempt to justify decisions but by reference
to their own or the parties' preferences rather than to principled
reasons, then formal justice would be an extraneous consideration to
the judiciary's and lawyer's frame of reference. What is more, if
formal justice were implemented, it would evolve only by chance.
Formal justice is admittedly a primitive type of justice. 60 Its
precept is that like cases be treated alike. It is a primitive type of
justice because it leaves unanswered any evaluation of the
distinguishing criterion by which one is to measure likeness. The
criterion could be racial. It could even differentiate slaves from
non-slaves on grounds of race, intellect, colour, status, military
defeat or whatever. Formal justice only requires that all persons
who possess the likeness criterion be brought under the application
of the rule. That is, the likeness criterion must be applied
impartially and consistently.
If a legal rule were simply asserted without any attempt to justify
why it ought to be applied in any particular case, how could the
59. The arguments in this section are drawn from William E. Conklin, "Clear
Cases" (1981),31 U. of T.L.J. 231.
60. See Brian Barry, Political Argument, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1965) at 100-102.
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legal rule be applied impartially and consistently unless the judge
consciously asked himself why a distinguishing trait in the legal rule
ought to be considered relevant in a clear case, and whether the
party before the court possessed that distinguishing trait. The later
question requires some rational process on the part of the judge. 'he
judge may conceivably be able to make the connection uncon-
sciously or subconsciously. But unless he does so in a conscious,
articulate fashion, we will not know whether the judge has even
addressed his mind to the issue of likeness. Law-making by
discretionary fiat does not assure us that the judge has addressed the
question of who possesses the distinguishing trait and why the trait
ought to be considered relevant in any particular case. Furthermore,
to the extent that reason has an effect upon one's decisions, a
conscious articulate justification of the application of the likeness
criterion will increase the chance that like cases will be treated
alike.
As in the instance of a judge who asserts a legal rule without
entering into any justificatory process, a judge who does justify his
decision but by reference to the parties' preferences rather than
principled reasons will not apply the likeness criterion impartially
and consistently. The outcome of any dispute will be partial to
whomever the judge perceives to represent the politically stronger
interest group in society at the time. To the extent that he accurately
assesses or predicts the power relationship, his decision will be
"sound". Similar cases will be treated similarly only if the power
situation remains relatively stable over time. One interest group
could conceivably be consistently powerful. If the power situation
varied from one case to another and the judge accurately assessed
that variation, however, the likeness criterion would be overruled in
each case in favour of a new likeness criterion, There would no
longer be formal justice.
(b) Substantive Justice
A second implication flows out of the preference model of legal
education: namely, there would be little possibility for a
coincidence of substantive justice with the law. In contrast to formal
justice, issues of substantive justice go to the content Yathey than the
equal application of legal rules. Issues of substantive justice usher
forth a plethora of end-state or entitlement theories about the
organisation of social institutions. Such theories involve indepen-
dently argued principles - independent, that is, of the feelings of
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one, two, a few or even many persons in society. Even if one were
to argue in support of a preference theory of substantive justice (that
is, that social institutions are just if they coincide with the innate
feelings of the members of society at any particular moment in
time), the very process of attempting to make such an argument
marks a departure from the preference model of legal education. For
it brings the advocate into a justificatory dialogue where reason and
evidence as opposed to mere preferences or assertions of feeling are
the criteria for a sound claim. Indeed, if one were to be consistent
with the preference model of legal education, the moral content of
legal rules would be resolved by the psychic intensity of the
assertions, the power of the claimants or, ultimately, their
instrumentalities of manipulation and violence.
(c) Liberty
An additional implication would arise if a judge were not prepared
to justify a legal rule or its application or if he were prepared to do
so but by an appeal to preferences rather than principled reasons:
namely, there would be no theoretical limit to the possession of
liberty. The politically stronger could take away a minority's right
to speak on political issues, to practise a religion, to join a political
party, or even to think certain thoughts. Conceptually speaking, the
politically stronger could legitimately discriminate or enforce
segregation according to race, sex, colour, creed and national
origin. Indeed, the politically stronger could metaphysically create
the existence of a racial, religious or political group toward which
the stronger could focus its hate and violence much, as Sartre
argued, the anti-Semites had done with respect to the Jews.61 A
judicial decision or legal opinion, without reasons, would leave no
assurance that any one individual would even be considered in the
resolution of any dispute before the court. Without the expectation
that opinions be explained and justified through reason and
evidence, conflicts before the court could only be resolved by the
psychic intensity, loudness, or numerial support with which a
litigious party shouted out his claims. Ultimately, force would
become the determining factor and tyranny the resulting norm.
Party would oppose party, belief would oppose belief without any
ultimate reference point for resolving a dispute except force. Only if
minority groups or individuals can expect that courts and lawyers
61. Jean Paul Sartre,Anti-Semite and The Jew (N.Y.: Grove Press, 1962).
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will appeal to principled standards external to the judge's or
lawyer's psyche can they possess any minimal hope, although by no
means a guarantee, that a party (including the state) could be
brought to an accounting.
The only issue for a judge, lawyer or law student who is content
to resolve disputes by appealing to preferences is whether he has
accurately assessed and responded to the actual "power realities" in
the case or in society at large. This assessment and response would
be brought into play in his choice and application of a
pre-established legal rule. Often, as in the case of Mr. Justice
Holmes, 62 the liberal judge would rely upon a legislative rule
precisely because the legislature most accurately reflected the more
powerful interests in contemporary society.
Of course, one may not object to the existence of tyranny. And it
may be necessary to carry on a third level justification as to why
liberty ought to be valued. But if we assume for the point of
argument that there is something objectionable to tyranny, then a
law student who appeals to preferences rather than reason in his
discovery and application of legal rules gives cause for concern
because mere preferences allow for no theoretical limit to the
repression of liberty. This is not to suggest that preferences ought to
be relevant in the legislative realm. Rather, only if there exists a
ground rule in the legislative or judicial process such that a minority
or an individual may confidently appeal to reason rather than to
mere preferences for the resolution of disputes can there be any long
term assurance that his liberty will be respected and protected.6 3 A
commitment to innate preferences does not, of necessity, require a
justificatory process. Nor do preferences, of necessity, require a
justification in terms of independent principled reasons.
(d) Guidance to Lawyers
There is a utilitarian reason why the justificatory process is such an
important element in legal education: namely, unless a judge or
lawyer can offer ajustification in terms of "neutral" and "general"
principles as to why a distinguishing trait in the legal rule ought to
62. See eg., Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45, 25 S. Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937 (1905);
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 47 S. Ct. 584, 71 L. Ed. 1042 (1927); Gitlow v. N.Y.,
268 U.S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138 (1925).
63. Again, an appeal to reason does not guarantee liberty. But it does allow that an
individual's interests will be considered and that the State will be brought to an
accounting.
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be considered relevant and unless he can justify why a particular
person in fact possesses that distinguishing trait, future lawyers will
possess little guidance to confront a novel set of facts. What
facilitates a lawyer's ability to advise a client in an original fact
situation is that some earlier court, particularly at an appeal level,
has rendered a principled reason for a decision in a similar case;
and, secondly, that that reason is sufficiently "neutral" and
"general" as to transcend the immediate circumstances.
This latter point seems to have been foremost in Herbert
Wechsler's mind when he argued that judges should support their
value choices by a "type of reasoned explanation" which is
"genuinely principled.''64 A decision was principled, Wechsler
argued, if it rested "on grounds of adequate neutrality and
generality" - neutral in that the judge would be prepared to follow
the reason for the decision in other hypothetical facts to which it
applies, 65 and general in that the reason would transcend the
immediate facts so as to connect the immediate decision with past
and future cases which presented potentially similar issues. That is,
a decision would not be formulated with reference to some proper
name or a fact category appropriate to only one person. The
neutrality and generality of a decision, according to Wechsler, must
inhere to every issue to the case. 66 And why are neutral and general
principles so important? Because the act of judging is framed and
tested "as an exercise of reason and not merely as an act of
willfulness or will." A court of law is an institution of reason rather
than "a naked power organ." 67
Some weight should be given to the ability of a legal system to
guide lawyers in their advice to clients. For, without principled
reasons to guide lawyers, the social and economic costs would be
extraordinarily burdensome both for potential litigants and for
society as a whole. Society is involved even in private litigation
because society must finance the institutional structure to resolve
64. Herber Wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law" (1959),
73 Harv. L. Rev. 1.
65. Wechsler, id. at 15. Note that Wechsler does not use the term "neutral" to
connote political neutrality. Quite to the contrary. Judicial decisions are
"inescapably political", he claims, "in that they [i.e. the issues] involve a choice
among competing values or desires, a choice reflected in the legislative or
executive action in question, which the court must either condemn or condone."
Id., at 65.
66. Wechsler, id. at 23.
67. Wechsler, id., at 24.
144 The Dalhousie Law Journal
the dispute. Litigation, to the extent that the parties could afford it,
would abound. And to the extent that the parties could not afford
litigation, disputes would remain unresolved, expectations frus-
trated, reasons for earlier clear cases hypothesized, and pre-trial
agreements transitory. For, why should a party to any dispute
remain content when the "resolution" out of court has been made
without reference to any "neutral" and "general" standard which
transcends the issues in any one case?
(e). A Majoritarian Political System
The justificatory process is required of judges and lawyers for one
final reason. The majoritarian model of a political system posits the
legislature as the institution which can be trusted to make the best
political decision. Because judges are appointed, the argument
goes, they cannot be trusted. Whereas the electorate can,
theoretically at least, rid itself of politicians, it cannot oust judges.
Consequently, majoritarianism presumes that legislators are ac-
countable to the people, but judges are not. In addition to
accountability, majoritarian theory generally assumes that because
legislators are elected, they are more closely in tune with society's
contemporary values. Further, the background principle of majority
rule gives added weight to the legislature's role. Because the
legislature alone is assumed to represent the will of the majority,
majority theory requires that courts act as passive deputies to the
legislature. For these reasons, majoritarian theory considers the
legislature as the most suited institution to render political
decisions.
Each of these arguments is, of course, debatable for its empirical
and normative content.6 8 Nevertheless, they have molded the
self-image of the judiciary in common law countries. One
consequence is that it is deemed offensive to majoritarian theory for
a judge to allow his feelings and intuitions to discover legal rules
without some attempted justification of the rule, and without some
attempted justification as to why a party before the court ought to be
brought under the rule in the clear case. As an "undemocratic"
institution in a "democratic" society, a higher degree of
68. See, e.g., William R. Bishin, "Judicial Review in Democratic Theory"
(1977), 50 Sourthern Calif. L. Rev. 1099; Jesse H. Choper, "The Supreme Court
and the Political Branches: Democratic Theory and Practice" (1974), 122 U. Penn.
L. Rev. 810; George Mace, "The Anti-democratic Character of Judicial Review"
(1972), 60 Calif. L. Rev. 1140.
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justification is demanded from the judiciary than that expected of
politicians. In addition, in order to remain consistent with the
majoritarian premises posited above, the judiciary must remain
cautious and restrained when counsel requests the court to choose
some value in opposition to that chosen by an elected institution.
The judiciary alleviates the latter dilemma in which it finds itself by
justifying its decisions and by doing so in a manner which defers to
standards external to the judge's will. It is the latter two
requirements which legitimize judicial decisions in a majoritarian
society.
III. The Problem of Clear Cases
In Section One of this paper I argued that the very heart of the
common law system - the "ratio decidendi" - did not allow for
the existence of pre-established, well understood legal rules. Many
conflicting equally authoritative rules could be chosen from any
judicial decision. Consequently, a legal education which was
"close to reality" or which focused upon "the most appropriate
means of achieving given ends" would not be bound up with the
elaboration of legal rules. This conclusion, as I suggested, raises
two problems. The first is that it would seem to provide the basis for
a preference model of legal education. I have just shown why such a
model of legal education is inconsistent with second-level
arguments about formal justice, substantive justice, liberty,
guidance to lawyers and majoritarianism. The second problem is
that although many conflicting, equally authoritative rules may
emanate from hard cases, that conclusion is inconceivable in clear
cases. A clear case, by its very nature, involves a case in which one
pre-established, well-understood legal rule appropriate to the
circumstances exists.
Indeed, student, law teacher and practitioner alike sometimes
claim that ninety-eight per cent of a practitioner's case-load
involves clear cases. The lawyer has been able to sort out the
material from the immaterial facts with a much envied ability to
determine the criterion of materiality. He has discovered the rules,
somehow rejecting some as legally irrelevant and adopting others as
legally relevant. Accordingly, a practical legal education would
only need to teach a student how to deduce a conclusion from the
application of the relevant rule to the material facts.
Although the diverse methods for discovering the "ratio
decidendi" of a case would make a clear case a conceptual rarity for
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judicial rules and even for legislative rules, as the Diybones
discussion demonstrated, let us assume that clear cases do exist. We
need not debate over percentages. What implications do clear cases
pose for a practical legal education? In particular, would a practical
legal education require anything other than the deductive process of
applying the relevant rule to the material facts? That is, are there
other standards, possibly implicit, to which a competent lawyer
must be prepared to appeal even in clear cases? And if so, why?
I. The Justificatory Process
The simple deductive process usually considered to be the essence
of the legal officer's function in a clear case leaves critical issues
unanswered. How is the law student to ascertain which facts are
material and which are not? What is it about a party to a dispute
which is sufficiently distinguishing to connect him to the fact
category? And why does the student reject some rules as legally
irrelevant and accept others as legally relevant? These crucial issues
cannot be answered without a justification which goes beyond the
mere assertion of a rule of law. The issues require a justification in
terms of independent principles which are sufficiently neutral and
general so as to transcend the immediate facts in the clear case.
Without such a justification, we will have no possibility of formal
justice, liberty, guidance for future lawyers, nor will we remain
consistent with the majoritarian theory of the judicial function.
Until now, the claim that we ought to have a practical legal
education has assumed that the law student's task in a clear case is
complete when he asserts a material fact as the reason for his
decision. But such an assertion is of an explanatory rather than a
justificatory nature. To explain why something has occurred is a
descriptive enterprise. When we explain that a particular material
fact is the reason for a judge's decision we implicitly assume that
the judge's decision-making is a rational process; that is, that the
material fact caused the conclusion. We could also have explained
the conclusion in terms of the judge's intuition, his personality, his
socio-economic class or whatever. We might look inwardly at his
psyche or outwardly at external factors influencing his conduct.
These are empirical claims which may or may not be true.
But they are a part of an enterprise which is very, very different
from a justificatory one. To explain why a decision has been made
is distinguishable from justifying whether a particular rule of law is
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the right or just one. The latter inquiry requires that we push behind
the rule to a second level where consideration is given to reasons
why the rule ought to be followed. The one is a descriptive
enterprise; the other is a normative one. To explain something is not
to justify it.
A rule of law, by itself, is a mere assertion. If, when pressed, a
judge is content to stop with the assertion of a rule, he fails to
perform his proper function even in a clear case. By stopping his
analysis with the assertion of a rule, the judge becomes entrapped in
the very appear to preferences which we just found so unbecoming
of a law student in the preference model of legal education for
reasons of formal justice and the like. Rather than appealing to
reason as the criterion of a sound judgment, such a student
implicitly adopts the position that "this assertion of the law is
correct because I feel it is so". Only if the student is prepared to go
on to ask the normative question "why ought this rule be applied
here," can he consistently escape from the trap of appealing to
preferences. And this requires that he be prepared to articulate and
weigh arguments in support of the rule, withdraw some arguments
for the rule in the light of the weight of counter-arguments, revise
the rule, and, by going back and forth amongst the arguments,
arrive at a provisional statement of why the rule ought to be the
appropriate legal standard in the circumstances.
One possible explanation why law students have found it
adequate to arrest their analyses by merely asserting a legal rule is
that the principled reasons foy justifying any payticular rule are so
commonplace that they need not be re-stated. The implicit reason
why students are justified in adopting a statutory rule, for example,
is that the legislature ought to be the supreme law-making institution
in the body politic. Accordingly, law students ought to subordinate
alternative rules, however meritorious, to the rules of the elected
legislature. One can push behind this principled reason, however, in
order to uncover further second level arguments along the lines
suggested in the reflective model of the judicial function.
The justification for the student's adoption of a legislative rule
could be grounded, for example, in the pivotal liberal principle that
there ought not to be an independent criterion of justice separate
from and prior to the procedure by which public authority is
constituted. Given that the procedure used to choose legislators is
fair, the substantive outcome of the process will likewise be
considered fair - or so the liberal argument goes. Consequently,
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the lawyer's adoption of a legislative rule will produce a just
outcome according to liberal theory. Presumably one could go on to
raise counter-arguments as to why a fair procedure would not
necessarily lead to a just outcome. Indeed, one could root the
judicial function in some competing political theory of justice. The
original legislative rule might be revised. And, by going back and
forth amongst the arguments, we could arrive at a principled
argument as to why the lawyer ought to consider the original
legislative rule legally relevant, why he ought to revise the original
rule, or why he ought to substitute some alternative rule in the
circumstances.
Similarly, the crucial reason why law students are justified in
applying a pre-established, legislatively - or judicially - created
rule in a clear case is that by doing so the students can be assured of
treating similar cases similarly. Formal justice ensues. However, as
demonstrated above, formal justice is a very primitive form of
justice in that it does not allow for any evaluation of the moral
content of the rule by which similar cases are to be treated similarly.
When one examines the substantive content of both statutory and
common law rules, however, one can often find principled
justifications for the rule other than formal justice.
These justifications can be framed in terms of tradition,
contemporary values, or the goals of society. The content of the rule
represents a choice which has been made amongst competing values
which, in turn, possess corresponding justifications. Once again,
the door is opened for the articulation of the justifications of
competing values, the weighing of formal justice vis-a-vis the latter,
the possible withdrawal of the original rule in favour of arguments
which go to the justice of the content of the rule, and the possible
revision of the original rule or the substitution of a new one. When
the function of a lawyer is seen in this light, one can appreciate how
it is that "ought" questions are the basis of a practical legal
education even in clear cases.
IV. The Reflective Model of Legal Education
Neither the preference model of legal education nor clear cases
create insurmountable problems to the general conclusion in Section
One of this paper that conflicting, equally authoritative legal rules
emanate from any one judicial decision. Formal justice, substantive
justice, liberty, guidance to lawyers and accountability require that
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the competent lawyer and law student not stop with the mere
assertion of his preferences. And the mere assertion of a rule of law
in a clear case, without more, entraps the student in the very appeal
to preferences which we have found so unbecoming of a lawyer for
reasons of formal justice and the like. I wish now to elaborate
briefly an opposing conception of legal education which I shall call
the reflective model.
The reflective model of a practical legal education presupposes
that there may exist an independent criterion or criteria of justice
separate from and prior to the process by which the court, the issues
or ultimate decisions are constituted. When the law student in the
reflective model discovers, construes, applies or elaborates rules of
law, there is presumed to be some source of knowledge from which
one can ascertain whether the legal rules are correctly chosen or
applied. The law student, law teacher or lawyer claims to possess
legal knowledge. To that end he proceeds to justify his opinion.
This process of reasoned justification is the source of knowledge for
law students in the reflective model. It lies at the heart of Herbert
Wechsler's claim that courts ought to seek
• . . criteria that can be framed and tested as an exercise of reason
and not merely as an act of willfulness or will. Even to put the
problem is, of course, to raise an issue no less old than our
culture. Those who perceive in law only the element of fiat, in
whose conception of the legal cosmos reason has no meaning or
no place, will not join gladly in the search for standards of the
kind I have in mind.
69
The reflective model of legal education requires that the student
consciously articulate and weigh arguments. Students must propose
competing rules, policies and principles, withdraw existing
judgments in the light of the weight of arguments, revise others and,
by going back and forth amongst the arguments, arrive at a
provisional statement of the appropriate legal standard in the
circumstances.
The reflective model of legal education leaves little room for
binding rules of law whether the rules be judicially or even
legislatively created. The weighty principle of formal justice
suggests that clearly-established, well-understood legal rules,
assuming that they exist, possess persuasive authority. But, once we
understand legal education in its wider institutional role in terms of
69. Herbert Wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law
(1959), 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, at 1I.
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formal justice, substantive justice, liberty, social and economic
costs and accountability, we can appreciate why law student, lawyer
and judge alike must be prepared to question and, if necessary, to
justify why a particular court ought to follow or disregard a
pre-established, well-understood legal rule. In both the hard case
where the "ratio decidendi" proves indeterminate and in the clear
case, the "is-ought" distinction collapses. The competent law
student is the one who perceives that collapse and can judge when
compelling normative or "ought" justificatory arguments require
that the provisional rules of law must, at a minimum, be brought to
an accounting and possibly even be revised.
If the student of law truly wishes to understand the law as it really
is in a democracy, he will have to be prepared to look backwards
into the legal and political tradition of his or even other societies in
order to appreciate the implicit or explicit theories, conceptions and
assumptions which have provided the justificatory basis of any
particular legal rule or series of rules. He will also be required to
carry on an "ought" or normative dialogue about the nature of
justice, liberty, moral and political obligation, and the ideal state.
The competent lawyer must be capable of shifting back and forth
between the competing conceptions of the law and the more
mundane world of alternative legal rules to arrive at a provisional
statement of the law.
In contrast, the procedure by which the student can evaluate
judicial and legislative decisions under the preference model is very
different. The commitment to reasoned justification is not part and
parcel of the student's role in the preference model. Quite to the
contrary. There is no need for the student to appeal to independent
reasons in a justification of the legal rule because the preference
model does not allow for the existence of a criterion of justice
separate from and prior to the feelings of the student himself or,
alternatively, the parties to the immediate dispute. The just decision
under the preference model of legal education is deemed to be that
decision which best reflects the strongest feelings at any particular
point in time. Consequently, the correctness or soundness of any
judicial or legislative decision in the preference model is evaluated
by reference to the gain or loss of the power of autonomous interest
groups or the gain or loss of power of particular individuals. This
frame of reference contrasts sharply with that of the reflective model
of a court.
The clash of the two models of legal education does not of itself
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establish why the criteria for evaluating a sound judicial or
legislative decision ought to be grounded in the reflective model.
But once we introduce the crucial concepts of formal justice,
substantive justice, liberty, guidance to lawyers and accountability,
we can better appreciate why the reflective model ought to
constitute the goal of a practical legal education. The argument in
support of the reflective model of legal education is grounded in
these five concepts, although the reflective model itself would
require that we be prepared to go on to justify why a legal education
ought to be grounded upon these five concepts rather than their
converse (unequal treatment, ad hoc justice, tyranny, greater social
and economic costs, and non-accountability). Suffice it to suggest at
this point in time that four of the latter five notions seem to be
anathematic to a democratic state.
A reflective model of legal education is also a practical legal
education. By taking account of the very heart of the common law
system - the 'ratio decidendi' of a case - it can be said to be "in
tune with the way the law really is" or "close to reality". By being
grounded in the concepts of formal justice, substantive justice,
liberty and accountability, it is "in tune with the way the law really
is" in a constitutional democracy. Indeed, the reflective model of
legal education is the most appropriate means of achieving certain
identifiable goals: namely, the goals of formal justice, substantive
justice and the like. And the reflective model of legal education is
practical in the third sense of the word practical: namely, Aristotle's
notion of judgment. The reflective model of legal education may
well be labelled a theoretical education in that it insists that the
student work with ideas at the highest intellectual and moral level
and depth. If such is its label, then a practical legal education is a
theoretical education.
V. A Practical Legal Education
The real world of discovering the "ratio decidendi" by adopting a
preference model of legal education raises serious questions for a
practical legal education in a democratic state. We have seen why
the competent law student ought to identify the justificatory
theories, concepts and traditions embedded in legal rules, principles
and policies. The competent law student ought also to be prepared
to ask normative questions concerning the nature of justice, liberty,
the state and moral conduct. Both sets of questions have serious
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repercussions for the content of a practical legal education. I shall
now raise two such implications
1. A Political Education
First, both sets of inquiries possess a political character.
Consequently, there is a sense in which a practical legal education
would also be a political education. What would be the nature of
this political education?
The usual sense of "political" refers to the context of party
politics. It is used to describe a person who represents a certain
political party or political interest group. Although the judiciary in a
country such as Canada is invariably appointed in return for years of
service or financial aid to the governing political party, this paper
has not substantiated why one could justifiably claim that, after they
are appointed, judges retain party allegiance and are motivated
according to the contemporary line of the Party. This clearly is not
the sense in which we can describe a practical legal education as
having a political character.
A second possible sense of the word "political" is that the judge
or lawyer should be viewed as a political actor much as a politician
is. Accordingly, we would examine the judge's behaviour in much
the same manner as we would the behaviour of other political
actors. This line of inquiry would focus upon the behaviour of the
court rather than the rule of law which the court applies. Our focul
point would be the actual vote in the case rather than the express or
implicit justifications which the rule typically invokes. Once again,
however, there is little in this essay which warrants that we describe
a judicial decision as political in this sense. For, as I have argued, it
is the justificatory process which characterizes the judicial function,
not the discovery process of the rules. A focus upon ultimate votes
in a series of cases underplays the importance of the justifications
invoked by a rule of law.
A third sense of describing a legal education as political is that
legal standards emanate from a political institution. Our focus, in
this sense, would be to perceive the court as we would any other
political institution such as the legislature, a political party or the
bureaucracy. One would empirically examine what particular
functions or role the court plays generally in society. Any outcome
in a hard or clear case would be connected and explained in terms of
that institutional role. One would bear in mind the similarities and
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differences which characterize the court and other institutions in the
structure of government. And one would question whether the
courts rather than other institutions are particularly suited to deal
with certain types of disputes. Once again, however, we must reject
this sense of the word "political", for this line of inquiry examines
the structure of government, whereas the justifications rooted in
rules of law involve ideas.
The sense in which a practical legal education ought to be
characterized as political is that there are justificatory ideas and
conceptions which are rooted in legal standards. 7 ' Those ideas and
conceptions are political because they make statements about the
distribution of power within society. For one thing, the distribution
of power can be analyzed in terms of ideas about the relationship or
role between one decision-making structure and another. Also, the
nttes of taw or compet't% "tratti" rettt iii the disttibution of
power by assignment of rights and duties, powers and immunities
and the like to certain categories of persons. Moreover, the
alternative "ratios" or rules affect the distribution of power by
permitting certain social practices or forms of conduct whereas
others are proscribed. Consequential defences and penalities are
posited when violations of the proscriptions occur.
Moreover, a practical legal education would have a political
character because hard and clear cases explicitly or implicitly
employ concepts which pose political issues. Concepts such as
private property, markets, parliaments, trials, free expression, libel
or the like pose normative issues as to how power ought to be
distributed in society. The concepts do not provide the answers to
those issues, nor do they report nor describe set patterns of conduct.
They pose political issues for which there may be many rival
conceptions as to how the issues ought to be resolved. Finally,
competing "ratios" or legal rules often try to incorporate a
particular conception which tries to answer the issue posed by the
concept. Accordingly, a rule of law is inescapably political in that it
states what choice has been made between rival conceptions or
'1. For examples o ihor w lba'e lfiel ut connect sfalor,2 : iTIea a Odit np4 £,n
the one hand and specific legal rules or alternative "ratios" on the other, see
generally William E. Conklin, "The Origins of the Law of Sedition" (1973), 15
Cr. L. Q. 277; "The Utilitarian Theory of Equality before the Law" (1976), 8 Ott.
L. Rev. 485; "The Political Theory of Mr. Justice Holmes" (1978), 26 Chitty's
L.J. 200; and "Constitutional Ideology, Language Rights and Political Disunity in
Canada," (1979), 28 U.N.B. L.J. 39.
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models for distributing power. It works out political ideas at a
concrete level.
When one understands the word "political" in this sense one can
better appreciate why a judge, lawyer or law student makes a
political decision even when he strictly applies a rule or leaves
changes in it to the legislature. Such a decision invokes political
ideas about the institutional arrangement of power as between the
courts and the legislature. The content of such a decision or
non-decision distributes power by proscribing some conduct or
permitting other conduct. Such a decision or non-decision poses
political issues concerning majoritarianism, rights, interest groups,
popular sovereignty, the nature of the state and the like. And a
judicial non-decision tries to answer such concepts by choosing a
conception of majoritarianism over competing conceptions of how
power ought to be distributed in society. A rule of law merely
transposes the choice of conceptions into an institutional setting in a
concrete case.
2. An Education about Substantive Justice.
The reflective model of legal education has a second implication for
the content of a practical legal education. It would be an education
about substantive justice. The word 'justice' is carefully chosen
over the word 'law' because the former connotes a normative or
'ought' enterprise whereas the latter does not necessarily do so. I
have made a case why a pyactical legal educatioin inv olv es an
'ought' world. Justice rather than virtue, goodness, harmony,
liberty, property or some other concept provides the focal point of
that education, although virtue, goodness and the like may well be
intimate elements in any one particular conception of justice. The
subject of justice, in turn, concerns at least two critical inquiries: the
first goes to the justice of the major institutions of society, and the
second goes to the justice of the content of the laws which the
institutions create.
With respect to the justice of the institutions, one would examine
major institutions as the source of the overall distribution of rights
and duties in the structure of society. For example, what institutions
process disputes, what institutions make general rules for society,
how do they operate, who are their clients, and how do the various
institutions interrelate? Another set of issues goes to the personnel
of the institutions: for example, the career structure of the judiciary,
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legislator or bureaucrat; the social distance between office holder
and client; the role self-image of the office holder; and the like.
Finally, do the institutions lend themselves to equal access by
relevant parties? Can the institutions produce a fair outcome if
wealth and power are unequally distributed? Will the alleviation of
the scarcity of legal services ensure a just society? If not, why not?
Are institutions unjust to the extent that, due to social or economic
circumstance, all members of society cannot effectively participate
in the institutions of law creation? These are some of the issues
which a practical legal education would entail.
The second line of inquiry concerns the justice of the statutory
and judicial rules. I have argued above that justificatory ideas and
conceptions are rooted in legal rules. Because the nature of justice
has been and will likely continue to remain the subject of debate, so
too the .ustifications of the ideas embedded iri the rles will be o3pe
to study. Consequently, a practical legal education would provide
the student with a curriculum which examines competing
conceptions of justice. It would also teach the student how to
connect particular justificatory ideas embedded in the rules to more
philosophic arguments about justice.
For example, if one were to analyze a Rawlsian conception of
justice, the following issues might arise:71 are Rawls' objections to
the liberal principles of careers open to talents and fair equality of
opportunity convincing? Has Rawls adequately distinguished
between the redress and difference principles and, if so, what are
the implications of his distinction for the individual's or group's
access to justice? How ought we to define the "worst-off" persons
and the "representative equal citizen"? Is Rawls right that we do
not have justice issues if society has no limited scarcity? Does
Rawls provide an adequate justification as to why his principles of
justice would be chosen over egoistic conceptions in the original
position? How can Rawls support basic liberties, and yet adhere to
his common interest principle? Can we weigh and restrict the most
extensive system of basic liberties without reference to outside
standards? What implications lie for his argument about an unequal
worth of liberty? What effects would a transfer system in income
taxes, a guaranteed annual income and a proportional expenditure
tax pose for claims for justice from all groups in society? And do
71. See generally William E. Conklin, In Defence of Fundamental Rights (Alphen
aan den Rijn/Germantown, Maryland, Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1979), c.5.
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social and economic inequalities involve inequalities in power, in
social status, in income, in wealth or in some other factor? Who is
owed the guarantee of justice?
If one were to examine substantive justice from a Marxist point of
view the curriculum might raise the following sorts of issues: in
what sense are people equal, according to Marxist thought? What
did Marx mean by "to each according to his needs", how would
one accurately determine and measure "needs", and what role is
played by desert? What did Marx mean by "to each according to his
work"? How does distributive justice fit into Marx's scheme of
society? In the Marxian model, does justice mean the legal process,
the legal institutions or legal rules? If not, why not? Would justice
require a genuine social revolution which could destroy the existing
legal structure and place the true relations of production in a
coincident position with the forces of production? Must it be a
genuine social revolution as opposed to a mere political revolution?
What implications of a Marxist conception of justice would lie for
the content and methods of community legal education?
Finally, if one were to choose a utilitarian conception of justice,
one might question the importance of formal justice in utilitarian
theory. 72 For example, are the notions of impartiality and protection
of the law peculiar only to utilitarian theory? Does utilitarianism
focus upon justice after rather than before the rules are made? Do
rule and act utilitarianism provide different responses to this
question? What sorts of issues would each type of utilitarianism
pose for p-ayticul-ay had oy zkeay cases2 Does utlitayianism equ;iye
universal, effective openness in the institutions of power? Does
utilitarian theory contemplate that all persons are to possess the
social and economic capacity to exercise their formal rights
effectively? Can more categories of persons (say, children, human
vegetables or animals) be guaranteed access to justice under
utilitarian theory whereas other conceptions of justice fall short in
this respect?
The above lines of questions concern only three conceptions of
justice. There are others. What is more, a reflective legal education
requires that the student be capable of setting the one conception
against the other. Furthermore, it requires that he be capable of
doing so not as an ideological enterprise which would be more to the
liking of a preference model of legal education but rather as a
72. See generally id., c.4 .
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reflective enterprise where compelling arguments of evidence and
reason are ushered in support of the competing conceptions. What
makes the above line of questions worthwhile is the modest prospect
of enlarging the student's and future lawyer's capacity to isolate and
question the justificatory ideas embedded in legal rules. They are
background questions designed to stimulate thought. The task of
connecting the questions to concrete cases remains the challenge for
the future teacher and student alike.
VI. Conclusion
The claim that a practical legal education would enumerate legal
rules and teach the student how to apply the rules can no longer be
sustained. The diverse methods of finding a "ratio decidendi"
prevent the existence of pre-established, clearly understood legal
rules in most, if not all, cases. Rather, the very heart of the common
law seems to allow the lawyer to pick and choose whatever "ratio
decidendi" he believes ought to be the law. But what characterizes
a properly decided judicial decision in any case is, first, the
justification of the decision and, secondly, a justification in terms of
independent, principled reasons rather than a preference. Accord-
ingly, the student who wants to understand the law "as it really is"
is the person who can carry on a second level normative dialogue as
to why we ought to follow one "ratio" or rule rather than another.
In contrast, an educational system which directed itself to legal rules
-and the. de uctive pv3cess w 3uld be a misdit e cted legat educatio -
if what one wanted was a practical legal education.
It is not enough for the law student to be able to "pick and
choose" the "ratio" which suits his own preferences. Nor is it
adequate for him to stop his analysis once he has somehow
discovered the relevant legal rule even in the clear case. The
inadequacy of an education which trains such a student stems from
the justificatory as opposed to the discovery element in a properly
decided judicial decision. And the latter flows from arguments
about formal justice, substantive justice, liberty, guidance to
lawyers and the majoritarian theory of political institutions. I have
argued that, embedded within the competing "ratios" and rules of
law themselves, there rest second-level political conceptions and
justificatory arguments which connect the rules of law to normative
issues of justice. Because of this intimate connection a practical
legal education would possess a political character. The connection,
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in addition, establishes why a practical legal education would focus
upon issues of substantive justice.
But these conclusions assume that what one really wants is a
practical legal education. And that, as suggested initially, is itself
questionable.
The Dalhousie Law Journal
Editorial Committee
Faculty John A. Yogis, Q.C.
Chairman and Editor
Barbara Hough





R. St. J. Macdonald, Q.C.
Students Tom Allen
Suzanne Cross
Editorial Assistant Christina Tari
The Dalhousie Law Journal is published by the Faculty of Law of
Dalhousie University. Communications having to do with editorial
matters should be addressed to The Editor, Dalhousie Law Journal,
Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada, B3H 3J5.
The Editorial Committee welcomes the submission of material for
possible publication and advises potential contributors that a style
sheet is available from the Editor. Views expressed in a signed
contribution are those of the writer, and neither Dalhousie
University nor the Faculty of Law accepts responsibility for them.
The Journal is printed by Earl Whynot and Associates Graphics
Limited, Trade Mart, Scotia Square, Halifax, Nova Scotia. All
communications concerning subscriptions should be addressed to
The Carswell Company Limited, 2330 Midland Avenue, Agin-
court, Ontario, MIS 1P7. The price of an individual copy is $6.00.
"Indexed": Index to Canadian Legal Periodical Literature
